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“No	  More	  Pressing	  Task than Organization in Southeast Asia”: The 
AFL–CIO Approaches the Vietnam War, 1947–64 
 
EDMUND F. WEHRLE 
 
The Vietnam War stands as the most controversial episode in the AFL–CIO’s four 
decades of existence. The federation’s support for the war divided its membership and 
drove a wedge between organized labor and its liberal allies. By the early 1970s, the 
AFL–CIO was a weakened and divided force, ill-prepared for a decade of economic 
decline. Few, however, recognize the complex roots of the federation’s Vietnam policy.  
American organized labor, in fact, was involved deeply in Vietnam well before the 
American intervention in 1965. In Southeast Asia, it pursued its own separate agenda, 
centered on support for a substantial South Vietnamese trade union movement under the 
leadership of nationalist Tran Quoc Buu.1 Yet, as proved to be the case for labor 
throughout the post-World War II period, its plans for South Vietnam remained very 
much contingent on its relationship with the U.S. state. This often strained but necessary 
partnership circumscribed and ultimately crippled the federation’s independent plans for 
Vietnamese labor. Trade unionists in South Vietnam found themselves in a similar, 
although more fatal, bind, seeking to act independently, yet bound to the Americans and a 
repressive South Vietnamese state. 
 
Scholars today often portray post-war American organized labor as a partner (usually 
a compliant junior partner) in an accord or corporate arrangement with other 
“functional groups” including the state and business.2 While there is undeniable truth to 
these portrayals, the very idea of “corporatism” was anathema to post-war American 
labor leaders, especially those in the AFL.3 Indeed, the leadership of the AFL loudly 
trumpeted its determination to maintain a principled distance and independence from the 
state.4 Such autonomy was central to American labor’s harsh critique of what it insisted 
was a world-wide Communist conspiracy. Unions in Communist countries were hardly 
unions at all, according to this critique, but merely extensions of the state.  American 
unions—by contrast—were “free trade unions,” operating independently and in the best 
interests of workers. 
 
Yet remaining free of state influence proved dif. cult for American labor, especially in the 
era of the expanding state. While the AFL and later the AFL–CIO would have preferred 
to carry out its Vietnam program through its own auspices or those of the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), an international federation of anti-
Communist labor movements founded in 1949, lack of adequate resources hindered these 
options. As the situation in Vietnam neared a crisis point in the early 1960s, the AFL–
CIO came to realize that its program for South Vietnamese labor could only be realized 
with substantial help from the U.S. government. In Vietnam, Buu and his fledgling labor 
movement suffered a similar struggle to retain an air of autonomy and legitimacy in a 
post-colonial environment that exulted the ideal of independence, yet in reality 
necessitated a painful dependence on outside forces.  Neither labor movement ever fully 
managed to master the balancing act required of modern free trade unions. 
 
By the beginning of World War II, a group of dedicated internationalists with strong anti-
Communist leanings had assembled at the AFL headquarters in Washington, DC. 
Included in the group were David Dubinsky, George Meany, Jay Lovestone, and 
Mathew Woll.5 Lovestone, an early leader of the American Communist Party, who 
turned sharply against Stalin after 1929, became the intellectual leader of this group. 
Early advocates of intervention against the Nazis, the AFL internationalists remained 
intensely anti-Communist even during the war and insisted—even as the U.S. was allied 
with the USSR—that Communism and Fascism were but two sides of the same 
totalitarian coin. 
 
After the war, the AFL internationalists devoted themselves to challenging the advancing 
threat of Communist unions in Western Europe. With limited resources and facing 
determined Communist opposition, the initial struggle proved challenging for the AFL 
internationalists. But massive intervention by the American state in the form of the 
Marshall Plan—which helped fund labor’s anti-Communist war—tipped the scales 
against Communist-controlled unions in Western Europe.6 This pattern of American 
organized labor attempting to act autonomously with mixed results, followed by a 
decisive intervention by the American state, repeated itself in Vietnam. 
 
It was in the midst of their battle for European labor unions that the AFL first 
encountered the Indochinese issue. Beginning in 1946, French determination to 
reassert colonial control over Vietnam sparked a bitter war between the French, with 
their superior . repower, and the Viet Minh, using guerilla tactics. While initially silent 
on the issue, in 1947 the French Communist Party declared its opposition to the war 
in Indochina. To further support this position, French Communists inaugurated a 
program of sabotage and strikes to halt shipments of materials to the war.7 AFL 
European representative Irving Brown and legendary French waterfront labor leader 
Pierre Ferri-Pisani organized anti-Communist unionists to break the strikes and counter 
the sabotage.8 
 
Given the French Communist campaign against the war, the AFL quickly came to 
view the Indochinese war as part of an international Communist conspiracy rather than 
a national struggle against colonialism. In AFL circles—as was increasingly the case in 
the U.S. government—it became a concrete article of faith that the Soviets controlled 
the Viet Minh. “Clearly, the invasion of Indochina,” explained an AFL pamphlet on 
Soviet infiltration of Asia, “is being openly planned by the Soviet Union.”9 The Free 
Trade Union News, the AFL’s foreign policy mouthpiece, ran a series of articles by 
Indian trade unionist S. R. Mohan Das on Ho Chi Minh, insisting that Ho was 
“completely and totally subservient to Moscow.”10 
 
During the first several years of the Indochinese war, the AFL—normally very vocal 
about all international issues—avoided any public or private utterances of concern, 
despite the federation’s long history of strong opposition to colonialism, dating back to 
its call for Cuban independence in 1896. By 1950, however, with the Cold War 
situation in Europe somewhat settled, the AFL finally began expressing open criticism 
of French colonialism. In January 1950, after his return from a trip to India, Irving 
Brown lamented that “unless we break with the past in Indonesia, in Indo-China, in 
South Africa … there will be no hope for maintaining what is left of Asia.”11 A year 
later, the AFL moved to back up Brown by calling for national independence and full 
rights for Indochina as a French commonwealth nation.12 
 
Meanwhile, the AFL prepared to counter what it believed to be Soviet infiltration of 
Southeast Asia. This campaign, the AFL hoped, could be waged by the newly created 
anti-Communist ICFTU, into which the AFL was sinking substantial money. The AFL 
desperately hoped that the ICFTU might operate as an activist force throughout the 
world, promoting anti-Communist trade unions. In 1950, at an ICFTU planning 
session, Irving Brown asserted that he could “think of no more pressing task than 
organization in Southeast Asia.”13 An ICFTU delegation, which included both AFL 
and CIO representatives, swept through Southeast Asia later that year, brie. y visiting 
Vietnam. There, it found evidence of a nascent labor movement in the French-controlled 
regions of southern Vietnam.14 
 
The movement was the creation of the French Confederation of Christian Workers 
(CFTC) in the late 1940s. The early organization attracted many of the Vietnamese 
nationalists, increasingly alienated by Viet Minh tactics and ties to the USSR. In 
particular, Tran Quoc Buu, a well-connected nationalist, born in 1912 in the northern 
portion of Vietnam, was drawn to the nascent movement. Already Buu was a veteran 
nationalist. His father had expelled him from the family home at the age of 14 for taking 
part in anti-French demonstrations. In 1940, French authorities sentenced him to 10 
years’ hard labor on Paulo Condore Island, the Devil’s Island of Indochina. In prison, 
Buu came into contact with key members of the Viet Minh, a Communist-led umbrella 
organization of nationalist groups begun in 1941. His prison contacts included Pham Van 
Dong, a prominent Viet Minh leader and future Prime Minister of the Democratic 
republic of Vietnam.15  
 
Although the details remain cloudy, it appears that the Japanese arranged for Buu’s 
release from prison in 1945 and then trained him, along with members of the religious 
sect Cao Dai, to overthrow the French Vichy government. Buu and the Cao Dai were 
among the leaders and groups that rallied to support the Viet Minh’s assertion of 
independence in the name of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to resist 
subsequent French efforts to reimpose colonial rule.16  
 
Yet both Buu and the Cao Dai gradually began to question their alliance with the 
Communists, whose nationalism they considered tainted by its ties to outside forces.  
Meanwhile, a French customs officer named Gilbert Jouan, working through the CFTC, 
had begun a campaign to organize native workers. Jouan persuaded Buu to take a lead in 
the project, and personally trained the young nationalist in the principles of Christian 
trade union thought.17  
 
With Jouan’s help, Buu put together a preliminary organization of workers that illegally 
began to unionize both rural and urban workers and later launched several aggressive 
strikes. In 1952, when Emperor Bao Dai revised the labor codes to allow for unions of 
native workers, Buu named his organization the Vietnamese Confederation of Christian 
Workers (CVTC).18 Although affiliated with the International Federation of Christian 
Trade Unions (IFCTU), or Christian International as it was known, the CVTC strove to 
incorporate a diverse membership. Buu himself was a Buddhist. 
 
Buu’s organization was just the sort of Third World development that the AFL 
hoped to harness to thwart the attraction of Communism and promote the benefits of 
free trade unionism. It hoped that the ICFTU would move quickly to extend further 
support to Indochina’s nascent unionists. Yet in spite of a follow-up mission to Vietnam 
in 1953, the ICFTU failed to affiliate or establish a system of support for the CVTC.19 
The ICFTU’s reluctance to act appeared to derive from longstanding competition with 
Christian International. European Socialists dominated the ICFTU and looked with 
suspicion upon the IFCTU, which they considered to be a more conservative 
organization, 
bound to the Roman Catholic Church. To the Americans, such longstanding 
European rivalries were infuriating, especially when they obstructed progress in the 
battle against Communism. Watching the ICFTU spin its wheels while tensions heated 
up in Vietnam, Lovestone angrily wrote Meany that “On Indo-China … we have 
missed out on a psychological moment.”20 
 
The AFL had better luck using its U.S. government contacts to obtain aid for the 
CVTC. Nelson Cruickshank, Head of the AFL Social Security Department and on 
temporary assignment as the Director of the European Labor Division of the Mutual 
Security Agency, arranged to have labor expert Dr. Joseph Zisman visit Indochina to 
evaluate the nascent labor movement. Zisman emerged impressed by the CVTC and 
reported that the “existence of young and inexperienced trade unions at this time 
present both a challenge and opportunity. Properly directed trade unions are among the 
strongest bulwarks for democracy.”21 
 
Zisman’s recommendations, however, were the source of controversy among those 
involved in the nascent American aid program in Vietnam. The mission’s education 
officer noted “considerable variation in comments made by different members of the 
Mission in regard to what actions the Mission should take toward a labor and labor 
ministry program.”22 There should be no surprise that a country with very ambivalent 
attitudes toward organized labor should resist actively cultivating an organized labor 
movement overseas. The AFL’s often tense, always awkward, relationship with the 
state suggests that even American organized labor shared some of this ambivalence. 
 
With the arrival of the more budget-conscious Eisenhower administration, however, 
foreign aid for programs for the Third World dried up.23 More seriously, the AFL 
worried that Eisenhower’s emphasis on “massive retaliation” over direct activism would 
compromise the anti-Communist cause in Southeast Asia.24 As the crisis in Indochina 
worsened in early 1954, the AFL feared that the international community and the U.S. 
government intended to abandon large portions of Indochina to the Communists. The 
major powers had gathered in Geneva, Switzerland, to discuss the future of Vietnam 
just as the French military position weakened with the Viet Minh siege at Dien Bien 
Phu. In late April, 1954, the AFL Executive Council issued a statement calling for an 
immediate end to French colonial rule to be followed by a massive program of military 
and economic aid to Vietnam.25 
 
Determined to influence events, Meany dispatched an agent to the 1954 Geneva 
conference with instructions to press the AFL agenda. The agent, veteran trade 
unionist Harry Goldberg, set up what he called his “OSS Operations” in Geneva, which 
centered around the distribution of AFL documents to delegates. The AFL materials 
aimed to dissuade delegates from partitioning Vietnam and convince them that 
nationalist forces—freed from French domination—could defeat the Viet Minh.26 
Should the delegates show interest, the AFL planned to contact sympathetic U.S. 
Senators Paul Douglas or Michael Mansfield to introduce legislation to direct massive 
aid to an independent Vietnam.27 After several weeks of lobbying, however, Goldberg 
realized that with the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu and Eisenhower’s vacillations 
little could be accomplished at Geneva.28 
 
When George Meany learned of the . nal results of the Geneva conference, he angrily 
assailed the division of Vietnam as appeasement on “a world scale which would make 
Munich pale into insignificance.” The AFL News Reporter added that “twelve million 
more persons, including three and a half million Roman Catholics were added to the 
Red world as half of Vietnam was abandoned.”29 
 
The AFL’s lament came at a time of great crisis for the CVTC. With the partition 
of Vietnam, thousands of CVTC members living above the 17th parallel attempted to 
escape south. An unnerved Buu wrote a supporter that the CVTC was “living through 
a real nightmare.” Two of the CVTC’s most important unions, totaling around 50,000 
members, were headquartered in the north. The CVTC hoped to evacuate those 
“energetically opposed to the communist regime,” but had few resources available for 
the undertaking.30 Inevitably, some were left behind. Any illusions that the Viet Minh 
might show mercy to members of a nationalist workers’ movement were shattered when 
officials of the new North Vietnamese government arrested two members of the CVTC 
who had voluntarily stayed in the north under the promise that they would be protected 
by the International Control Commission. Reports reaching Buu indicated that North 
Vietnamese authorities had arrested the two and sentenced them to forced labor on the 
Chinese border.31 The swarm of unionists who . ed south from the Viet Minh along 
with the memory of those left in the north cemented the anti-Communist leanings 
already present in the ranks of the CVTC. 
 
The AFL did what it could to help Buu’s organization, but with limited resources 
and with neither the ICFTU nor the U.S. government actively involved, American 
labor could offer little real comfort. Buu, therefore, sought out other alliances to anchor 
the CVTC in the dangerously changing times. He quickly found a wealthy and potentially 
powerful (and dangerous) ally in Ngo Dinh Nhu, the political operative 
whose brother, Ngo Dinh Diem, was a strongly anti-Communist nationalist whom Bao 
Dai named as Premier in June 1954. Nhu carefully cultivated the CVTC and may have 
provided it with much-needed funds for the resettlement of the refugees and other 
projects.32 In return, Buu joined Nhu in forming the Can Lao Party to support Diem’s 
political aspirations.33 
 
Buu’s collaboration with Nhu in the controversial Can Lao Party offered the CVTC 
an invaluable shield during the volatile early days following the partition of Vietnam. As 
President of South Vietnam, Diem’s vigorous attacks on the Binh Xuyen sect of 
gangsters controlling the ports of Saigon opened the harbors to CVTC organizing.34 
The CVTC rapidly grew in the first 2 years following the Geneva conference. The 
Tenant Farmers’ Union, in particular, expanded dramatically with the personal support 
of Nhu.35 By late 1955, the CVTC publicly claimed to have 500,000 members, 
although it privately admitted to having only around 350,000.36 
 
Alongside successful organizing campaigns, the CVTC also grew increasingly militant. 
In 1956, it launched strikes that shut down both the port of Saigon and later the 
city’s major electrical plant. In the countryside, 13,000 members of the CVTC’s 
plantation workers’ affiliate struck for better pay and working conditions at four of 
South Vietnam’s major rubber plantations.37 At the end of June, 1956, the CVTC even 
threatened a general strike to protest remaining resistance to unionization.38 The 
organization also commenced campaigns to bring electricity to working class 
neighborhoods, improve education, establish medical clinics, and rebuild areas of Saigon 
destroyed in the upheavals of 1955.39 All this occurred with Diem’s explicit support. On 
May Day, 1956, Diem issued a statement to the workers of his country, assuring them 
that their government “placed labor above capital” and recognized the right of workers 
and unions to participate in the “direction and progress of the country.”40 
 
Delighted with the CVTC’s progress under the Diem regime, the AFL enthusiastically 
embraced the new South Vietnamese government. The AFL News Reporter praised Diem 
as a “progressive” and a “reformist,” willing to fight landlords and “feudal 
forces.” Under Diem, the AFL proclaimed, a “far-reaching step was taken to stimulate 
the democratic process in strife-torn, divided, yet strategically vital Vietnam.”41 
 
But while Buu’s membership in Can Lao had brought great gains, he worried about 
Nhu’s and Diem’s volatility and his own independence. In a post-colonial culture that 
placed exaggerated value on independence and autonomy, Buu’s alliance with the 
Nhus had a definite downside. Expressing a persistent preoccupation for Buu (and 
Vietnamese in general)—fear of undue outside influences—the CVTC President told 
the American Embassy that he “was reluctant to become over-obligated” to the 
government by “accepting outright grants from it or any of the political parties.”42 Nor 
was Buu shy about expressing his concerns to Diem. In a meeting with the President 
in February 1956, Buu explained that “his idea of democracy was not [Diem’s] 
hand-picked assembly.”43 Buu followed up by refusing to give a blanket endorsement 
to the Can Lao slate running for the assembly. He also amplified his attacks on local 
officials who mistreated CVTC members and officials. None of this pleased the 
imperious Diem. The final straw between Buu and Diem, according to American 
Embassy observers, came with the failure of the CVTC to pass a resolution pledging 
support to Diem’s government.44 
 
By October, 1956, a concerned American Embassy reported to the State Department 
that Diem’s attitude toward labor had completely changed. Government officials 
openly condemned the CVTC and reimposed colonial-era prohibitions against large 
meetings without prior government approval.45 Meanwhile, Nhu turned viciously on 
the Tenant Farmers’ Union. Fearing that the union’s initial success might lead to real 
agrarian reform, Nhu turned over to large landlords control of a network of Farmers’ 
Associations, designed to provide affordable credit to tenants. The landlords quickly 
transformed the associations into instruments designed to manipulate and control 
tenants. A reign of terror descended upon the Tenant Farmers’ Union. Several union 
leaders were thrown into jail and some languished in prison for years. The entire affair 
only fueled further anti-Diem sentiments in rural areas.46 
 
In the midst of the troubles, Buu walked a dif. cult tightrope. Privately, he lambasted 
the government, but in public he avoided criticism, fearing that he would be jailed and 
that his movement would collapse.47 He had other problems as well. While a wholesale 
campaign of subversion had yet to begin, Buu was aware that Communists with 
revolutionary designs had infiltrated his movement. As veterans of the Viet Minh 
campaign, CVTC leaders knew these tactics well and claimed to know the identity of the 
spies in their ranks, often choosing to allow them to operate under the belief that 
an enemy should be kept close. But in 1957, a Viet Minh agent operating in the ranks 
of the CVTC was arrested and jailed when authorities found incriminating documents 
in her residence.48 The incident put Buu’s movement under a cloud. 
 
As the situation appeared to be slipping out of control in Vietnam, the AFL–CIO had 
few remedies at its disposal. The ICFTU continued to prove ineffective in Vietnam. 
Having shelved efforts to affiliate the CVTC, the ICFTU affiliated the Worker’s Union 
of Vietnam (UOV), the smallest by far of the three rival labor federations in South 
Vietnam. The UOV affiliation further alienated the CVTC from the ICFTU.49 AFL– 
CIO Asian agent Richard Deverall bitterly complained to Meany and Lovestone that 
the Indians who operated much of the ICFTU machinery in Asia were not only 
“hopelessly inefficient” but also resented in the rest of Asia.50 Deverall’s vehemently 
expressed concerns convinced Lovestone of the “tragedy and stupidity of the ICFTU 
operations in the Far East.”51 
 
As the ICFTU floundered, the U.S. government enjoyed a bit more success in 
responding to the needs of Vietnamese workers. Although U.S. Operations Mission 
(USOM) in South Vietnam originally had budgeted no money for labor programs, 
USOM staffer Jodie Eggers, formerly of the CIO–Woodworkers, lobbied energetically 
for funds that might help the CVTC.52 Within a year, Eggers had launched several 
“labor schools” to train CVTC unionists.53 So complete was Eggers’s dedication that 
he labored on his weekends with CVTC members constructing housing for resettled 
workers.54 Eggers’s programs expanded in 1957 to include training courses to be given 
across the country by a team of 20 full-time teachers, funded by a $200,000 grant from 
the U.S.55 
 
Instead of embracing these developments, ICFTU General Secretary J. H. Oldenbroek 
complained bitterly that the International Cooperation Administration (the 
coordinating body for U.S. aid programs), with its plans to extend its training programs 
in Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, was “interfering with the programs and plans of 
the ICFTU.”56 
 
But the nascent U.S. government program quickly ran into other problems. In 1958, 
with the reassignment of Eggers to Pakistan, the USOM’s relationship with the CVTC 
began to deteriorate. Again reflecting his concerns over his organization’s autonomy, 
Buu refused demands for an audit of his organization’s use of American money. The 
USOM responded by ending both the subsidy and the labor aid program. Humiliated, 
the CVTC seethed with “anti-American sentiment.”57 Despite its own desires to avoid 
a partnership with the U.S. government, the AFL–CIO increasingly became convinced 
that, if it could play a greater mediating role, such misunderstandings could be avoided 
in the future. 
 
Given its frustrations with the ICFTU and its developing hopes that the U.S. 
government might more actively and delicately intervene to help the CVTC, the 
AFL–CIO welcomed the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960. In particular, Kennedy’s 
bold assertion of “we can do better” appeared to offer an exciting opportunity to reverse 
the nation’s reactive pose in foreign policy. 
 
Especially attractive to labor was Kennedy’s recognition that social, political, and 
economic developments were integral to the battle against Communism in the Third 
World.58 In Latin America, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, with its emphasis on both 
social and military efforts, offered an opportunity for such cooperation. AFL–CIO 
leaders quickly convinced themselves that they could accept funding and work closely 
with government officials while still maintaining an essential autonomy. The federation 
embraced the Alliance for Progress and volunteered to aid in the labor side of the 
administration of the program.59 Together, government and labor jointly founded and 
funded the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), which established 
training programs for union leaders from Latin America, brought young labor 
leaders to the U.S. for classes, and generally promoted the cause of free trade unionism 
in the region. In late 1963, the Kennedy administration expanded its partnership with 
organized labor, creating a permanent labor advisory committee to the Agency for 
International Development (AID), the agency created in 1961 to replace the International 
Cooperation Administration and Development Loan Fund.60 In contrast to his 
growing involvement with AID, Meany moved to distance himself from the ineffectual 
ICFTU by withholding AFL–CIO dues payments and stepping up his public criticism 
of the organization.61 
 
Supported by AID money and inspired by Kennedy’s call to action, the AFL–CIO 
aggressively moved to cement and repair relations with the nascent labor movements of 
the Third World threatened by Communism, such as the CVTC. Without question, 
the AFL–CIO’s most effective overseas agent was Irving Brown. His reputation, by the 
1950s, had spread across the world. Communists viewed him as a dangerous agent 
provocateur, a ruthless covert operator with strong Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
ties, dedicated to thwarting Communist influence on international labor. Although he 
remained focused on European affairs, the perceived ineffectiveness of the ICFTU 
forced the AFL–CIO to rely on Brown’s unique abilities world-wide. 
 
In 1961, Communist gains in Laos, Diem’s ever growing repression, and rumors that 
Buu would soon be arrested, placed the labor situation in Southeast Asia on Irving 
Brown’s agenda.62 Brown arranged for a short trip to South Vietnam.63 Arriving in 
Saigon on November 15, 1961, Brown quickly moved to size up the Vietnamese labor 
movement. He immediately recognized a country in disarray, haunted by the “poverty 
and misery of the masses.” He traveled through the slums of Saigon, where the vast gap 
between rich and poor drew his attention. The Viet Cong, Brown quickly recognized, 
successfully had managed to “identify itself with the thinking and actions of the masses 
and the reality of daily existence,” while Diem’s government remained mired in 
corruption, ineffectiveness, and repression. “Unless there is a cleansing of the Augean 
stables and an introduction of new, hopeful political elements into the regime,” insisted 
Brown in his official report, “the masses, especially the peasants—will not defend the 
regime.” 
 
Brown, however, did find some hope in South Vietnam’s maturing labor movement 
and the leader of the CVTC, Tran Quoc Buu. Only the CVTC, under Buu, “constitute 
a moral or social side of what must be a total fight against a total enemy.” Buu and 
Brown conferred closely. Buu told the AFL–CIO representative that he had lost faith 
in Diem, and complained of Diem’s persecution of the labor movement. He described 
his hopes for the CVTC and impressed Brown with his commitment to anti-Communism. 
 
As he left Vietnam, Brown was “so impressed with Buu that I believe he should be 
considered in terms of any possible reshuffling of the political control of the 
government.” 
Perhaps more importantly, Brown had come to view the CVTC not only as a 
political and social force, but also as “a possible para-military” force.64 According to 
Buu, Diem brie. y had enlisted the CVTC for paramilitary purposes, as had Emperor 
Bao Dai before him, but, in both cases, Diem and Bao Dai had turned against the plan 
for fear of creating an armed political opposition.65 
 
Following Brown’s warnings about Diem in 1961, the AFL–CIO grew increasingly 
concerned as Diem remained intransigent, refusing to adopt reform measures. After 
returning to Paris, Brown made contact with elements in the Vietnamese exile 
community 
in France. These contacts urged him to use his influence against the South 
Vietnamese state and in support of the “real” nationalists operating against Diem in  
South Vietnam.66 In 1962, as repression mounted in Saigon, Meany interceded with 
Kennedy and Rusk asking them to protect Buu in his increasingly precarious position.67 
 
In September, 1963, as the situation in Saigon was nearing the unraveling point with 
the growing Buddhist protest movement, Harry Goldberg met (at the suggestion of 
Buu) with a group of Vietnamese exiles representing the Democratic League of 
Vietnam. The group, led by Dr. Nguyen Ton Hoan, told Goldberg that Buu had 
recently journeyed to Paris secretly to build support for a coup against Diem. Hoan— 
who along with Buu had formed the nationalist Dai Viet political party in 1948—urged 
Goldberg and the AFL–CIO to intensify anti-Diem lobbying in Washington. He 
claimed to have earned the sympathies of Michael Forrestal, an aide to McGeorge 
Bundy, and proposed to replace Diem’s regime with a “broad-democratic, anti-
communist 
coalition.”68 
 
Along with his secret lobbying, Buu began to take a more public posture of 
opposition to Diem. In the fall of 1963, he sharply criticized Diem in testimony to a 
United Nations committee investigating Vietnam.69 Seeking Buu’s counsel, the AFL– 
CIO invited him to attend its 1963 convention scheduled for mid-November. President 
Kennedy also was to attend, and the occasion would give the two a chance to meet and 
an occasion for Buu to put Vietnamese labor on Kennedy’s agenda. In the end, 
however, a covert American-sponsored coup of Vietnamese Army generals overthrew 
Diem, ending his repressive regime. In the aftermath of the November coup, Buu chose 
to stay in Vietnam to try to influence events.70 He missed his opportunity to meet with 
Kennedy, whose speech to the AFL–CIO convention was one of his last. 
 
Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson (LBJ), had done little to impress labor during 
his tenure in Congress but, as Vice President, LBJ aimed to broaden his political base. 
He rallied all his energies and considerable powers of persuasion to transform 
successfully the relationship between himself and labor.71 Johnson carefully studied 
labor’s agenda and was well aware of its particular interest in foreign affairs. When he 
toured Asia in the spring of 1961, Johnson met with union leaders and carefully included 
references to the Asian labor scene in his official report. In South Vietnam, he 
recommended industrial aid, public education, and that local government “enforce 
existing labor laws and work toward social reforms.”72 
 
As President, even more so than Kennedy, Johnson seemed to embrace labor’s 
long-held vision of aggressive full-employment economics and social spending at home 
coupled with activist anti-Communism abroad.73 This, combined with LBJ’s charm 
offensive, compromised whatever was left of the AFL–CIO’s vaunted independence 
from the state. The federation quickly developed a relationship of unprecedented 
closeness with Johnson. This partnership set the stage for the events of 1964, which 
would draw the AFL–CIO and the CVTC further together. 
 
Following the coup against Diem, the AFL–CIO and the CVTC hoped for a 
liberalization of South Vietnamese labor policies. Yet many of the same, Diem-era 
officials continued to harass the peasantry, local farmers, and labor organizers.74 When 
a second coup occurred in January, 1964, Buu—fearing arrest—went into hiding. In the 
power vacuum that followed the coup, Buu’s name surfaced at the State Department 
as a possible candidate for the South Vietnamese premiership.75 General Nguyen 
Khanh, however, emerged to take control, although his hold on power remained 
tenuous. Seeking to eliminate possible threats, the general ordered Buu’s arrest on 
charges of favoring neutrality. Concerned about Buu’s safety and the threat his arrest 
might have on perceptions regarding South Vietnamese democracy, the American 
Embassy facilitated a meeting between Buu and Khanh in early February. There the 
two managed to work out a preliminary plan for coexistence.76 
 
Given these tumultuous events, the AFL–CIO realized that, in order for the CVTC 
to survive, it needed more in its favor than the federation alone could provide. With the 
U.S. government prepared to make an unprecedented effort to shore up the South 
Vietnamese economy, the AFL–CIO moved to make sure that officials considered 
Vietnamese organized labor in the plans. The AFL–CIO President, recognizing Buu’s 
vulnerabilities, aggressively began to lobby on behalf of the CVTC. Meany personally 
invited Buu to address the May AFL–CIO Executive Council meeting.77 He also 
arranged a personal meeting between Buu and President Johnson. At their May 20 
meeting, Johnson assured Buu that to him the con. ict in Vietnam was as much 
a political as a military battle and that he recognized the importance of trade unions 
to both battles.78 Buu, in turn, also emphasized the centrality of free trade unions 
and urged the President to work for further democratization in South Vietnam. 
The “missing link in the present Vietnamese chain of events,” Buu explained 
to Johnson, was a free labor movement which could “accomplish the double objective 
of alleviating their [Vietnamese workers’] daily hardships and creating an almost 
para-military type of civilian organization.”79 A few short months following their 
meeting, Johnson used a supposed attack on an American destroyer in the Gulf of 
Tonkin to press through Congress legislation that essentially gave him war powers in 
Vietnam. 
 
During his Washington visit, Buu made a “tremendous impression” on both 
government officials and union leaders. In his meetings with AFL–CIO officials, he 
agreed to accept help in establishing training programs for cadres assigned to areas 
“controlled” by the Viet Cong, as well as funding for the construction of new welfare 
centers and propaganda programs. But, as in his earlier con. ict with the USOM, 
Buu’s neo-colonial fears for his organization’s autonomy quickly surfaced. He insisted 
that AFL–CIO financial aid be modest. Again, in spite of his great need, he wished to 
avoid either dependence on the Americans or the perception of dependence. Like the 
AFL–CIO in its relations with the U.S. state, the CVTC pragmatically sought the 
help it felt it needed, but still strove to retain a facade of independence.80 
 
Despite Buu’s preoccupation with his organization’s autonomy, his meeting with 
the American President clearly provided him and the CVTC with a new aura of 
power and influence in Vietnam. General Khanh responded by easing restrictions on 
labor. In the liberated atmosphere, a flurry of new organization took place. The 
plantation and tenant farmers’ unions—which had been virtually decimated by Nhu— 
rebounded as tens of thousands of Vietnamese farmers and workers joined CVT-affiliated 
unions.81 
 
Encouraged by the gains made by the CVT, Lovestone asked Arnold Beichman, a 
journalist closely associated with the AFL–CIO, to tour Vietnam as a means of 
assessing Buu and the re-emerging labor movement. Beichman found the CVT a 
vibrant organization. Buu particularly impressed him. Yet Beichman also recognized 
the federation’s vulnerability. Buu was the “target” of the military, political parties, and 
rival unions. The CVT had no real blueprint or plans for the future. It also continued 
to find itself subject to the whims of local officials. By providing basic guidance and 
political support, Beichman argued, American labor could be the CVT’s lifeline.82 
 
In early August, Irving Brown returned to Vietnam to further cement the relationship 
between the CVT and the AFL–CIO. Brown began by setting up a meeting between 
himself, Buu, and General Khanh. There, Brown pressed Khanh to involve the CVT 
in every aspect of governance. Khanh signaled a general acceptance. But Brown pushed 
further, asking “what about the implementation in the villages? In the districts? In the 
provinces?” Khanh assured Brown that he would use his influence to ensure that the 
CVT was incorporated into decision-making at all levels. Brown also met with AID 
administrator James Killian, whose support would be needed to help finance the 
AFL–CIO’s developing plans for a program to help the CVT. Killian “indicated a great 
willingness to work directly with us,” and, to Brown’s relief, seemed to offer the 
AFL–CIO relative autonomy in terms of how funds were to be spent.83 
 
In his final report on his mission, Brown again raised the possibility of using the CVT 
as a “para-military” organization in which members might have “contact with the 
village military guards and with the local authorities in order to have the arms—mostly 
defensive—necessary to protect the organization.”84 
 
With his leadership already under . re from all segments of South Vietnam in the 
summer of 1964, General Khanh launched a crackdown on dissent. He declared a state 
of emergency, severely limiting public meetings. The CVT—determined never again to 
show the weaknesses it had with Diem—decided to react forcibly. This time, it would 
have a much more engaged AFL–CIO and U.S. government in its corner. To harness 
support for a several-weeks-old strike against a textile plant and to protest General 
Khanh’s actions, Buu announced a general strike in the fall of 1964.85 With Saigon 
increasingly collapsing into chaos as different groups competed for power, Buu hoped 
the strike would assert the CVT as a viable social, economic, and political force. A 
general strike—even one the Viet Cong might use to their advantage—would 
demonstrate the independence and potency of the CVT to all of Vietnam.86 Veteran 
French 
journalist Jean Lacouture saw the strike as having a definite “political aspect, in fact a 
clearly revolutionary one.”87 
 
On September 21, the CVT launched its general strike. Buu telegrammed the 
AFL–CIO requesting support that might influence the government not to crack down 
on the strikers. Meany immediately telegrammed back, proclaiming “our all-out 
unstinting 
support to the free and independent workers organized in the CVT under your 
great leadership.”88 The U.S. State Department, however, shared little of Meany’s 
enthusiasm and worried that the strike was yet “another example of national 
indiscipline.” 
89 
 
With the city’s electrical workers on strike, Saigon sat in darkness, without water, 
electricity, phone service, or bus transportation, for a full day. A total of 60,000 CVT 
members joined in the strike. Buu led a group of several thousand strikers through 
Saigon to Khanh’s offices, where they presented their demands. The general was 
conveniently out of town, but his aides negotiated with the strike leaders.90 By the end 
of the day, the CVT and Khanh’s deputies reached a tentative agreement easing labor 
restrictions and allowing for an end to the day-old general strike. Lacouture viewed the 
general strike as an unqualified success: “for the first time a force arose that could be 
either a possible replacement for the present regime or a link to the enemy regime or 
the . rst pillar of a regime to come.”91 
 
But in directing its actions against the government, the CVT had upset the delicate 
balance of labor–state relations in South Vietnam. Its insistence that the strike concerned 
only labor issues fooled no one. While dramatically asserting itself, the CVT 
created new enemies and infuriated older ones. Khanh now had every reason to try to 
neutralize this latest threat.92 On October 10, authorities included Buu’s name on a list 
of 13 military officers and seven civilians to be arrested on charges of conspiring against 
Khanh in a failed September 13 coup.93 
 
Upon receiving his summons on the coup charges, Buu turned immediately to his 
strongest supporter, the AFL–CIO, which he hoped could muster the support to 
counterbalance the South Vietnamese state.94 Infuriated at the arrest, George 
Meanydrafted a caustic statement denouncing the government of South Vietnam for its 
“inhuman and destructive action in trumping up treason charges against Buu,” and 
insisting that whatever actions Buu took were “with full knowledge and agreement of 
the U.S. government.” Secretary of State Rusk, fearing that Meany’s statement was too 
“harsh” and might exacerbate circumstances, eventually managed to get his friend 
Meany to remove some of the blunt language. The AFL–CIO president, however, 
insisted on making a statement that Rusk admitted was “as mild as we could expect.”95 
 
The dynamics of the particularly strong labor–state relations of the mid-1960s now 
were set in motion. Helping Buu became a priority for the Americans. In Saigon, the 
American Embassy prepared a letter “summarizing in agreed form” the events of the 
day. Buu, however, always cognizant of not appearing beholden to the Americans, 
refused to use the letter in his trial.96 Yet few could have missed where the U.S. 
government stood on the issue. The South Vietnamese government could ill afford the 
specter of convicting a labor leader who, only months before, had met and established 
an informal understanding with the American president. To the absolute relief of all 
parties, a military court found Buu innocent of all charges on October 22.97 Buu 
immediately cabled Meany to offer his thanks.98 
 
In December, George Baldanzi, president of the Textile Workers’ Union, visited 
Vietnam on behalf of the AFL–CIO. Despite the gains made by the CVT in 1964, 
Baldanzi still found a desperate situation in which the disciplined Viet Cong had 
developed “clear-cut programs around which peasants could be rallied.” Urban 
workers—although not aligned with the Communists—were largely neutral in the 
struggle. “The Vietnamese labor movement,” Baldanzi concluded, “is without any hope 
today.” Dues-paying membership was falling, and Buu remained in a politically perilous 
position. The AFL–CIO, Baldanzi concluded, would have to make a much more 
fundamental commitment to the CVT and South Vietnam. This would require a 
permanent AFL–CIO liaison in South Vietnam and the funding for CVT projects.99 
 
The events of 1964 revealed both the potency and the continuing vulnerabilities of 
the CVT in South Vietnam. On the eve of American intervention, as Baldanzi’s report 
indicated, the CVT remained at the mercy of its government and the general tumults 
of life in the war-torn country. The South Vietnamese labor organization desperately 
needed the help of the AFL–CIO and the American government. Ties to the Americans 
were, in fact, the CVT’s only leverage against an oppressive state—its lifeline. Yet a 
closer working relationship with the Americans would leave it vulnerable to charges of 
being a pawn of foreign interests in a country obsessed with post-colonial concerns 
about dependence and independence. 
 
Likewise, by the end of 1964, the AFL–CIO found itself in a similar paradox 
regarding Vietnam. Impressed by Buu and the CVT’s potential as a rallying force 
against the Viet Cong and as a vehicle for domestic reform, the AFL–CIO hoped to 
establish a strong mentoring relationship with the emerging labor organization. Yet 
alone, the AFL–CIO lacked the resources for such an endeavor. Nor could the 
federation expect any aid from its international labor connections, which had proven 
either uninterested in or incapable of aiding the CVT. If there was to be any hope of 
furthering its agenda in South Vietnam, it required the AFL–CIO to expand its 
cooperative relationship with the U.S. government. Such were the circumscribed 
choices faced by both labor organizations. 
 
As early as 1965 the tragic pattern had already been set: the survival of South 
Vietnamese labor required both labor movements to enter into uncomfortable 
partnerships—alliances with each other and with their respective governments that, while 
offering a necessary lifeline, also brought the fatal taint of dependence and subservience 
to these free labor movements. In time both the CVT and the AFL–CIO made the 
necessary accommodations. Even so the hour was already too late in Vietnam. Many 
opportunities already had come and gone, and meanwhile support for the Viet Cong had 
grown stronger.100 With events rapidly unfolding, there could be little hope of reversing 
an irreparable course. 
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